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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty  years  ago  the  Carter  Commission  recommended
integration of the Canadian  individual and corporate  income  taxes.1
Although modest initial programmes of integration were proposed by
1 Canada, Royal  Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 4 (Ottawa:  Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair  K. LeM. Carter).
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the  U.S.  Treasury  in  19842  and  adopted  by  the  U.S.  House  of
Representatives  in  1985,3  the  final  version  of  the  massive  Tax
Reform Act of 1986 did not include  any steps  in that direction.  In
other respects, however, the 1986 legislation profoundly affected the
relationship  between  corporate  and  individual  American  income
taxes, most likely requiring significant further changes in the Internal
Revenue Code.
This  paper  examines  the  current  situation  in  the  United
States in three parts.  Part I begins by briefly  reviewing the principal
conceptual  models for taxing corporate income.  Part II analyzes  in
detail  the  impact  of  the  1986  legislation  on  the  relationship  of
individual and corporate income taxes in the United States.  Finally,
Part III briefly suggests  possible directions for future legislation and
the  continuing  relevance  of  the  Carter  Commission  recom-
mendations.
II.  TAXING  DISTRIBUTIONS  OF CORPORATE  INCOME
A.  Current Conceptual Models
There are six major models of corporate income taxation that
have  received  recent  attention  in  the  United  States:  (1) Haig-
Simons  accrual  taxation,  (2) current  taxation  of corporate  earnings
to shareholders, (3)  classical double taxation of dividends, (4) Carter
Commission  integration,  (5)  cash  flow  taxation,  and  (6)  an  inter-
mediate proposal developed by the American  Law Institute's Federal
Income  Tax Project.
1.  Haig-Simons  accrual  taxation
Under  the  most  widely  accepted  definition  of  income,  a
model income  tax would  tax individuals  on  changes  in the value of
2 United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform for  Fairness,  Simplicity, and Economic
Growth vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Treasury  Dept., 1984) at 134-44 [hereinafter Treasuy
Ta  Reform Study].
3 H.R. 3838, 99th  Cong.,  1st Sess.,  § 311 (partial  deduction  for dividends paid).
1988]OSGOODE HALL  LAW JOURNAL
their  assets,  including  shares  of  corporate  stock.4  Such  accrual
taxation  would  reflect  in  the  individual  income  tax  base  income
earned by corporations  resulting in increased stock values.  Although
implementation  of such  a regime for  at least  publicly-traded  shares
has long been discussed,5  concerns  about liquidity and valuation have
kept  such  proposals  from  gaining wide  acceptance.  The  rationale
for  adopting  such  a  regime  would  be  that  the income  tax  should
reflect changes  in the wealth  of individuals as accurately  as possible,
and  that  corporations  do  not  possess  independent  tax-paying
capacity.
2.  Current taxation of corporate  income to  shareholders
In lieu  of taxing  shareholders  currently  on increases  in  the
value  of  their  shares,  corporations  could  continue  to  compute
income, which would be attributed to shareholders  and taxed  in the
year  earned.  Partnerships  have  long  been  pass-through  entities
under  U.S.  tax  law,6 and  corporations  can  elect  such  treatment  if
they  are closely-held  and  have  relatively  simple  capital  structures.7
Pass-through  status for  all corporations  has  generally  been rejected
on the grounds that it would be too  difficult to  attribute corporate
earnings in complicated capital structures  and that it would be unfair
to  tax  shareholders  who  did  not receive  distributions  of corporate
earnings.
The classic  formulation of what is generally  referred  to as the Haig-Simons  definition
of income is  by Henry Simons:
Personal  income may be  defined as  the algebraic sum of (1) the market value  of
rights  exercised  in  consumption  and  (2)  the change  in the  value  of the store  of
property rights  between  the beginning and end  of the period in  question.
H. Simons, Personal  Income Taxation (Chicago:  University  of Chicago  Press,  1938)  at 50.
5  See, for example,  D. Slawson, 'Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock" (1967) 76 Yale L.J. 623; D.J. Shakow, 'Taxation Without Realization:  A Proposal
for Accrual  Taxation"  (1986)  134 U.  Pa. L. Rev. 1111;  B.  Wolfman,  "Subchapter C and  the
100th Congress"  (1986)  33 Tax Notes 669 at 673-74.
6 U.S. Internal Revenue Code 26 USCS  §§ 701-761  [hereinafter IRC].
7  IRC, ibid §§  1361-379.  Electing  corporations  are generally  known  as  "subchapter S
corporations" after the applicable  portion of the Internal  Revenue Code.
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3.  Classical double  taxation of dividends
The model that is usually said to characterize the traditional
U.S. regime  is  the "classical" system,  under  which  corporations  are
taxed  as income  is  earned by  the entity,  and  shareholders  are  also
taxed  when  that  income  is  distributed  in  the  form  of  dividends.
Hence the return on corporate equity capital is said to be subject to
a  "double" tax.  This  characterization  does  not  apply to  the return
on  corporate  capital  provided  in  the  form  of  debt  or  leased
property, because  interest  and rent payments  are deductible  by  the
paying  corporation.  The rationale  for  this  regime  is  that  whatever
the ultimate incidence  of the  corporate tax is, corporate income,  as
defined by  the return to equity capital, should bear a tax burden  in
addition to the burden imposed on capital income generally, perhaps
as a  fee for the benefits of operating  in  corporate form.8
4.  Integration of the individual and  corporate income taxes
The fourth model of corporate taxation eliminates the double
burden  of  the  classical  system,  by  means  of  either  a  corporate
deduction  for  dividends  paid  or  a  shareholder  credit  for corporate
taxes  paid.9  The  Carter  Commission  developed  a  sophisticated
version of shareholder  credit integration that was intended to retain
for Canada  a  tax on corporate  income  flowing to  foreign investors
from  Canadian  enterprises.10   The  rationale  for  adopting  an
integrated regime was that the corporate income tax should function
as  a  withholding  mechanism  for  an  individual  income  tax collected
on  a realization,  rather than an  accrual, basis.
The  Carter  Commission's  innovative  suggestions  included
setting  the  corporate  tax  rate  equal  to  the  highest  individual  rate
and allowing  deemed  distributions  in a shareholder-credit  system  of
8  See R. Good,  The Corporation  Income Tax (New York:  Wiley,  1951)  at 26-40.
9  See C.E. McLure, Jr., Must Corporate  Income Be Taxed Twice? (Washington:  Brookings
Institution, 1979); A-C. Warren, Jr., 'The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate
Income Taxes  (1981)  94  Harv. L  Rev. 717.
10 Carter  Commission Report, supra, note 1 at 49-70.
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integration.  Because  it  would  generally  be  in  the  shareholders'
interest for corporations to deem the corporate earnings distributed
each year in order to make  available refunds due  to the shareholder
credit,  such  a  system  could  ultimately  bring  about  current
shareholder taxation of corporate  income,  as described  above.
5.  Cash flow taxation
In recent years  there has  been renewed  interest  in a regime
under  which  corporations  would  deduct  not  only  current  business
expenses,  but also  capital costs,  such  as  the  cost of machinery  and
equipment.'1  Such  a  tax  would  be  a  corporate  correlative  of  a
personal  consumption  tax,12  would  continue  to  collect  taxes  on
income produced by assets already in  corporate solution, and would
allow the government to share in the excess  of the return  on future
corporate  assets over the rate of interest on government  borrowing.
This  last  function  of  a  corporate  cash  flow  tax  can  be
illustrated with an example.  Suppose the Treasury could borrow  at
an  annual  interest  rate  of  10  percent.  Deductible  corporate
investment of $200 would  require the government  to forgo  $100  of
revenue  as  a result of the deduction if the corporate  tax rate were
50  percent,  increasing  government  borrowing  by  $100.  If, after  a
year, the corporate investment were liquidated in exchange  for $300,
the  Treasury's  share  would  be  $150,  of which  it would  retain  $40
after  repaying  its  $100  of  borrowing  plus  $10  in  interest.  As  a
result, the  Treasury would  have  shared  in  the  excess  of corporate
profits  over  the  relatively  riskless  rate  of  return  on  government
borrowing.  Canadian  scholars  have  demonstrated  how  this  profit-
11 For example, Institute for Fiscal Studies,  The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation
(London:  George Allen  & Unwin,  1978) (Chair  J.E. Meade) at 228-45 [hereinafter Meade
Committee Report]; R.W. Boadway,  N. Bruce  & J.M. Mintz, "Corporate Taxation  in  Canada:
Toward  an  Efficient  System" in  W.R.  Thirsk  & J. Whalley,  eds  Tax Policy Options in  the
1980s (Toronto:  Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982).
12 A personal consumption  tax would  reach only the consumption portion of the Simons
definition of income set forth in note 4, supra, and could  be levied on a cash-flow basis.  For
differing views regarding implementation  of such a tax, see W.D. Andrews, "A Consumption-
Type  or  Cash  Flow  Personal  Income  Tax'  (1974)  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1113;  MJ.  Graetz,
"Implementing a Progressive  Consumption  Tax'  (1979)  92 Harv. L Rev. 1575.
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sharing  function  of a  corporate  cash  flow  tax  could  be  combined
with the withholding function of integration.1 3
6.  American  Law Institute federal  income  tax project
In  1982,  a  study published  by  the American  Law  Institute
suggested  enactment  of  a  corporate  deduction  for  dividends  paid,
with  the  deduction  limited  to  dividends  earned  on  amounts
contributed  to  corporate  enterprises  after  the  date  of enactment
("new  equity").14  The  deductible  amount would be further  limited
to  a  specified  rate,  similar  to the return  on  corporate  debt.  This
proposal  was  intended,  like integration,  to  avoid the double tax on
the return to corporate equity, but without a windfall gain to current
shareholders,  the  price  of whose  shares  presumably  reflects  the
anticipated  corporate  tax  on  assets  already  in  corporate  solution
("old  equity").  Because  the deduction  for  returns  to  new  equity
would  be  limited  to  a  specified  rate,  this  proposal  can  also  be
interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  reach  profits  on  new  corporate
investments  in excess  of that rate, with  an effect  similar  to  that of
a cash-flow  tax.
B.  Implementation of the Models
Although  these  models  provide  conceptual  guidelines  for
designing  corporate  tax systems,  the  models  are generally  not fully
implemented  in  particular  national  systems.  Canada,  for  example,
adopted  a  form  of partial  shareholder-credit  integration  after  the
Carter Commission Report, but  the  system  as  enacted  does  not
13 For example,  R.W.  Boadway,  N.  Bruce,  J.M.  Mintz, "The Role  and  Design  of the
Corporate  Income Tax'  (1984)  86  Scand. J. of Econ.  286.
14 American  Law  Institute,  Federal Income  Tax Projec  Subchapter C:  Proposals on
Corporate Acquisitions and  Dispositions, and Reporter's Study  on  Corporate Distributions
(Philadelphia,  Pa.:  ALI, 1982) at 356-400.  This volume contains both the Institute's proposals
regarding  corporate  acquisitions  [hereinafter ALI Acquisition Proposals] and  its  Reporter's
study regarding  corporate  distributions  [hereinafter ALl Reporter's Study].  Only the  former
carry the imprimatur of the Institute.
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always  accomplish  integration.15   Indeed,  shareholders  can  under
certain  circumstances  obtain  credits  for  taxes  that  have  not  been
collected  from  the  distributing  corporation,  a  phenomenon
sometimes  known  as  "superintegration.'16   Many  other  developed
nations  have  also  adopted  a  partial  form  of integration  in  recent
years,  usually  opting  for the  shareholder-credit  method,  in  part  to
preserve taxation of corporate income paid to foreign shareholders.1 7
In the United States, the  full  rigours  of the  classical system
of double taxation could be mitigated in a variety of ways before the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, including  the  conduct of business  through
partnerships  or special categories  of corporations.18   When business
was  conducted  in  regular  corporate  form,  the  burden  of  the
corporate  tax  could  be  reduced  by  supplying  capital  as  debt  or
leased  property.  In  addition,  a  1935  Supreme  Court  decision,
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 19 had come  to  mean
that  corporations  were  not  taxed  on  the  previously  unrealized
appreciation  on corporate  assets when those  assets were distributed
to shareholders,  creating  another  opportunity to  avoid  one level of
tax.  Even when two taxes were collected, the shareholder  tax could
be substantially reduced if the distribution of corporate earnings was
accomplished  in  a  transaction, such  as  repurchase  of shares  by the
corporation,  that  gave  rise  to  a  capital  gain,  which  was  taxed
substantially  less heavily  than  ordinary  income.20   The effective  tax
15 Income Tax Act, S.C.  1971,  c.  63, ss  82, 121.
16 See,  for  example,  D.P.  Jones,  "Corporations, Double  Taxation,  and  the  Theory  of
Integration" (1979)  27 Can. Tax. J. 405; D.P. Jones, "Further Reflections  on Integration:  The
Modified  Small Business Deduction,  Nonqualifying  Businesses, Specified  Investment Income,
Corporate Partnerships,  and Personal Service Corporations" (1982)  30 Can. Tax J. 1;  G. Bale,
"A Call for Fundamental Tax Reform from the U.S. Treasury:  Some Implications for Canada"
(1985)  33  Can. Tax J. 269 at 287-96.
17 See  generally,  International  Fiscal  Association, Imputation Systems  - Objectives and
Consequences (Deventer.  Kluwer,  1983).
18 See supra, notes 6 and  7.
19 296  U.S.  200 (1935).
20 Internal Revenue  Code, supra, note  6  as  am.,  § 1202  (providing  for  a  60  percent
deduction  of net long term capital gains  prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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rate on certain  new  capital  investments  could  also  be substantially
reduced  by  the  capital  recovery  provisions,  which  made  available
deductions  and credits  with a present  value equal to expensing,  the
standard  result  under  cash  flow  taxation.2 1  Finally,  the  highest
corporate tax rate was historically  lower than the highest individual
tax  rate, so  that the "double" tax  could often be  advantageous  for
taxpayers, because earnings could compound in corporate solution at
a  higher  after-tax  rate  of return  than  they would  in  the hands  of
individual shareholders.
In  addition  to  a  complex  set  of  rules  and  distinctions
governing  distributions  of corporate  income  to  shareholders,  U.S.
corporate  tax law prior  to  1987  had  developed  a highly  articulated
system governing corporate  mergers  and other re-organizations.  In
general,  the  statute,  cases,  and  rulings  attempted  to  distinguish
between taxable sales  and  non-taxable  reorganizations  on  the  basis
of continuity of investment.22  The basic idea was  that corporations
and shareholders  should be taxed where there  was  a change  in the
substance, but not the  form, of their investment.  These provisions
were often  criticized  for  their  awesome  complexity.23  In addition,
some observers argued that shareholder taxability should not depend
on the same criteria  as corporate  taxability  and  that the corporate-
level  results  were  often  effectively  elective  for  sophisticated
practitioners.24  Finally,  a  troublesome,  unsettled issue  of statutory
21 See Meade Committee Report, supra, note  11; A-C.  Warren, Jr., "Accelerated  Capital
Recovery, Debt, and  Tax Arbitrage" (1985)  38  Tax Law.  549.
22 See  generally,  M.A. Levin & M.D.  Ginsburg,  'Taxing  Corporate Acquisitions  -
A Summary  of the Agonizingly Complex State of Current Law" in American  Bar Association
Tax Section and New York Bar State Association Tax Section, Proceedings  of a Conference  son
Subchapter C (forthcoming,  1987)  [hereinafter  Subchapter C Conference Proceedings].
23 INd
24 See the discussion infra at 336.
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design  was  the  extent  to  which  net  operating  loss  carryforwards
should be transferable  in  mergers and  acquisitions.25
In general,  the U.S.  implemented  the double  tax model for
U.S.  corporations  on  a  worldwide  basis  with  a  credit  for  foreign
taxes  paid 6  The  separate  corporate  identity  of subsidiaries  was
generally respected for these purposes, making the income of foreign
branches  of  U.S.  companies  taxable  in  the  year  earned,  while
deferring  taxation  of  the  income  of  foreign  subsidiaries  until
repatriated  to the subsidiary's  U.S. parent  company.27
III.  EFFECTS OF  1986 TAX  REFORM  ON U.S.  CORPORATE
INCOME TAX  STRUCTURE
We  now  turn to  the effects  of the  1986  legislation  on  the
relationship  between  individual  and  corporate  income  taxes  in  the
United States.  After briefly  reviewing the  most important  changes,
some of the corporate tax design issues implicated  by those changes
will be considered  in detail.
A.  Major Changes  Affecting the Relationship between Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes
Three  aspects  of  the  1986  legislation  will  have  a  major
impact  on the  tax  consequences  of corporate  distributions.  First,
Congress  repealed  the  General Utilities doctrine,  assuring  that the
corporate  tax  will  apply  to  distributions  of  appreciated  corporate
25Congress had adopted new limitations  in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but those
limitations were widely criticized  and  replaced  with new  provisions  in  the Tax Reform Act  of
1976, which were, in turn, controversial and never went into effect.  See U.S. Internal  Revenue
Code, supra, note 6  at § 382 (as enacted in  1954 and  amended in  1976).
26 IRC, supra, note 6  at §§  901-906.
27Ibid at §902 provides a credit for foreign  taxes paid  by the subsidiary with respect  to
repatriated  earnings.  See note  94, infra, for provisions limiting the availability  of deferral.
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assets. 8  Implementation  of this  change was deferred  until 1989 for
certain closely-held  corporations  worth less than $5 million. 29
Second,  the  preferential  treatment  of  capital  gains  was
eliminated3 °  After the change is fully  effective, the only advantage
of a  capital  gain  over  ordinary  income  is  that  the  former  can  be
used  to  fully  offset  capital  losses,  whereas  only  $3000  of ordinary
income  can be  offset by  capital losses  annually.31  Continuation  of
limited  deductibility  for  capital  losses  prevents  taxpayers  from
realizing  their  capital  losses  in  order  to  reduce  taxes  on ordinary
income,  while  retaining  assets  on which  there is  unrealized  capital
gain.
Third,  the  historic  relationship  between  individual  and
corporate tax rates  was reversed,  so that, when  fully  phased  in, the
maximum  corporate  rate  will  be  34  percent  and  the  maximum
shareholder  rate  will  be  28  percent.32  Immediately  before  the
legislation,  the  maximum  corporate  rate  was  46  percent,  and  the
maximum  individual  rate  was  50  percent.  Before  1981,  the
maximum  corporate  rate  was  48  percent,  and  the  maximum
individual  rate was  70 percent.
The  only  major  structural  change  enacted  with  respect  to
corporate  mergers  and other reorganizations  was  the adoption  of a
new  set of limitations  on  net operating  loss  carryforwards.33  After
a  significant  shift  in  stock  ownership,  annual  deductions  for  loss
carryforwards  by the corporation will now be limited  to the value of
the  corporation  before  the  change  in  ownership  multiplied  by  a
long-term tax-exempt  rate of return.  This  limitation  is intended  to
28Ibid at §§ 311,  336.
29  Tax Reform  Act  of 1986 H.R.  3838,  99th  Congress,  2nd  session  §633(d).  The
transitional  relief is phased  out for  corporations worth  between  $5  million and $10  million.
3 0 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 1202.
31 Ibd § 1211.  The excess  can be carried  forward  indefinitely.  Ibid  at §  1212.
32 Ibid at §§ 1, 11.  Lower rates and certain other tax benefits are phased out as income
rises,  so that  the total  marginal  rate of tax may be higher during the phase-out.
33 Ibid at § 382.
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restrict  use  of the  loss  carryforwards  to  approximately  the  income
that could have been generated by the corporation without a change
in ownership.34
The major 1986 innovation regarding international  corporate
income was the imposition of a Canadian-type branch profits tax on
U.S.  branches  of  foreign  companies  in  addition  to  the  regular
income tax.35  The rationale  for the additional  tax is that the double
U.S.  tax  applicable  to  corporate  subsidiaries  of foreign  companies
(which  are  taxed  once  when  income  is  earned,  and  again  when
dividends  are  paid),  should  also  apply  to  foreign  companies
operating  in the United States  through branches.36
B.  Current Issues in Corporate Tax Design
The 1986  legislation raises  issues  for corporate  tax design  in
four major  areas:  (1)  the scope of the  corporate tax base,  (2)  the
treatment  of shareholders  on  receipt of corporate distributions,  (3)
mergers, acquisitions,  and liquidations,  and (4) international  income
flows.
1.  Scope  of the Corporate Tax Base
The  reversal  of  the  historic  rate  relationship  between
individual  and  corporate  taxes,  the  elimination  of  the  General
Utilities doctrine,  and the repeal of the capital gains preference have
substantially  increased  the  tax  cost  of doing  business  in  corporate
form in the United States.  As  a result, the months  since adoption
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have been characterized  by intensive
activity and discussion by tax practitioners focused on minimizing  the
double tax by removing  assets from corporate solution.  As  a result,
some  practitioners  have  issued  dire  warnings  about  the  coming
U.S.  Congress, Joint Committee on  Taxation,  General  Eplanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (Washington:  U.S.  Government Printing Office, 1987)  295-96.  These limitations
derived  from  the ALIAcquisition Proposals,  supra, note 14  at 237-90.
35 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 884.  Cf. Income TaxAct, supra, note  15 at Part XIV.
36 General Eplanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra, note 34 at 1036-38.
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"disincorporation"  of  America. 7   Three  basic  techniques  are
involved.
First,  increased  use  may  be  made  of  forms  of  business
organization  that are not subject to the corporate  tax.  In particular,
large  publicly-traded  partnerships,  known  as  "master  limited
partnerships,"  are now  pushing the  limits of the extent  to which  an
entity can display corporate attributes without being characterized  as
a  corporation  for  tax  purposes 8   Similarly,  many  closely-held
American  businesses  have,  or  will,  elect  to  be  taxed  under
subchapter  S  of the Internal Revenue  Code, which  passes  through
taxable income to the shareholders  currently  and does  not impose  a
separate  corporate  income  tax.39
Second,  corporations  that  cannot  make  use  of  the
partnership or subchapter  S provisions can effectively reduce the size
of the  corporate  tax base  by  substituting  debt  for  equity  in  their
capital structures, so that corporate income is distributed  in the form
of deductible  interest, rather than nondeductible  dividends.  In  the
simplest form of transaction, a corporation might borrow funds, after
which  it would  purchase  its  own  shares  on  the  stock  market.  A
more sophisticated  transaction  is the "leveraged buy-out" which  has
attained great popularity in recent years  as a means of taking public
companies  private.  Such  buy-outs  typically  result  in  a  highly
leveraged  capital  structure  and  a  substantially  reduced  tax  base.
Similarly,  corporate  acquisitions  that  are  not  intended  to  take  a
public company private have sometimes used high-interest-rate  "junk
bond" financing, which  generates  interest  deductions  in  lieu of the
37  See L.S. Freeman, "Some Early Strategies for the Methodological  Disincorporation of
America  After the Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986:  Grafting  Partnership  Onto  C  Corporations,
Running Amok with the Master Limited Partnership  Concept, and  Generally Endeavoring to
Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities" (1986)  64 Taxes 962;
W.  Friedrich, "The Unincorporation of America" (1987)  15 J.  Corp. Taxation 3; P.C. Canellos,
"Corporate  Tax  Integration:  By  Design  or  By  Default"  in  Subchapter  C  Conference
Proceedings, supra, note 22.
38 See Treasuy Tax Reform Study, supra, note 2 at 146-49  (proposing  that large limited
partnerships  be taxed  as corporations.)
39 Other pass-through entities under current law include regulated investment companies,
real estate investment trusts, and real estate mortgage investment conduits.  IRC, supra, note
6 at  §§ 851-860G.
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dividend payments previously made to the shareholders of the target
corporation.  Finally, "leveraged recapitalizations" have recently been
developed  on  Wall  Street  as  a  way  of substituting  debt  for  equity
where  there is a  substantial body of continuing shareholders.40
Third, even where  assets currently  in corporate solution will
continue to bear the corporate tax, techniques  are being developed
to  insulate future  business  prospects  from  that  tax.  For  example,
instead  of  raising  capital  and  pursuing  a  business  idea  itself,  a
corporation  might  enter  into  a  joint  venture  with  a  widely-held
partnership  to pursue the project.41  By using this  form of business
organization,  the  share  of  business  earnings  directed  to  non-
corporate  partners would  escape  the corporate  tax completely.
A number  of these  techniques,  such  as  the  substitution  of
debt  for  equity,  involve  the  complication  that  no  tax  may  ever  be
collected on the capital income earned through corporate enterprise,
because the supplier of capital may be a non-taxable foreign  lender
or an exempt  institution  or pension fund.
In general, these techniques  can be thought of as varieties of
do-it-yourself  integration  in  a  system  that  supposedly  rejects  the
integration  model in  favour of the  classical  double  tax.  Under  the
current regime, some corporate income is thus subject to the double
tax, while  other,  arguably  corporate  income  is  subject  to  effective
integration, perhaps  with non-taxable  suppliers  of capital.  Most  of
the  opportunities  described  above  are  not  new,  but  the  1986
legislation  increased  the  incentive  to  avoid  the  corporate  tax.
Additional taxpayer activity  along these lines will presumably require
a clearer  articulation of when  the classical  double tax will  apply.  In
particular,  Congress  or  the  Treasury  will  have  to  decide  whether
publicly-traded  partnerships  are  to  be  classified  as  corporations;
whether the single-tax regime  of subchapter  S should  be  expanded
or contracted;  and whether  interest  deductions  should  be  available
on debt substituted for equity.
Because of the pressure placed on the corporate  tax base by
the 1986 reversal  of the historic relationship  between corporate  and
40 See  Canellos, supra, note 37.
41 See  Freeman, supra, note 37.
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individual  rates, Congress will  also have to decide whether  it should
restore  a  corporate  rate  that is  not  significantly  higher than,  or is
below,  the  maximum  individual  rate.  If the new  rate  structure  is
continued,  consideration  will have  to be given  to whether  there is
still any  need for the penalty taxes  that are designed to  discourage
the  accumulation  of  corporate  earnings  and  the  formation  of
personal holding companies  to avoid individual  taxation.42
2.  Taxation  of distributions  to shareholders
A second  area  in  which  the  1986  legislation  dramatically
changed  the  federal  income  tax  stakes  involves  the  taxation  of
shareholders on the distribution of corporate earnings.  Before  1987,
a  dividend  received  was  ordinarily  income  if  the  distributing
corporation  had  current  or  accumulated  earnings  and  profits,
historically  a  measure  of  corporate  earnings.43  If, on  the  other
hand,  earnings  were  distributed  by  means  of  a  corporation
repurchasing  its shares,  and the repurchase was not re-characterized
as  a  dividend,44  the  selling  shareholders  would  be  taxed  on  the
excess  of  the  amount  received  over  their  cost  basis,45  with  that
excess  usually eligible  for capital gains treatment.  Such distributions
of corporate earnings at capital  gains rates were generally known by
the colourful  name of "bail-outs".  This  advantageous  treatment was
available  not  only  for  redemptions,  as  the Internal Revenue  Code
styles share repurchases, but also for qualifying complete and partial
liquidations and for certain purchases by corporations of shares from
individual stockholders.
46
42 IRC, supra, note  6 at §§ 531,  541.
43 Ibid. at  §§ 301,  312,  316.
44 The basic test for dividend  equivalence  involves an inquiry into whether shareholders
have experienced  a diminution in their proportionate interest in the corporation, on the theory
that  dividends are typically pro rata. See ibid. §  302(b).
45 Ibid. at §  1001.
46 Ibid. at § 331  (complete  liquidations),  § 302(b)(4)  (partial liquidations).  IRC § 304
provides that purchases of stock by a related  corporation may be re-characterized  as dividends.
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Similarly,  certain  stock  dividends  would  not  be  taxed
currently, but could give rise to capital gains  on a later sale or other
disposition.47  Certain spin-offs of the stock of corporate subsidiaries
to  shareholders  of  a  parent  corporation  would  also  not  cause
immediate shareholder taxation, but would benefit from capital gains
treatment  when  those  shares  were  later  sold.48  To  complete  the
treatment  of sales  of corporate  stock,  the  "collapsible  corporation"
provisions would convert the usual capital gain on sale or liquidation
or  corporate  shares  into  ordinary  income  where  corporate-level
realization was  avoided.49
This  array  of  provisions  can  be  generalized  with  the
statement  that  the  Internal Revenue  Code  distinguished  between
dividend  and  non-dividend  distributions  of  corporate  earnings  in
three significant  ways  before  the  Tax Reform Act of 1986.  First,  a
dividend was generally  fully  taxed  as  ordinary  income, while  a  non-
dividend distribution might benefit from the capital gains preference.
Second,  dividends  and  non-dividend  distributions  had  different
measuring  rods  for  the  recovery  of  capital  that  is  necessary  to
identify  income in the sense  of gain.  Dividends  required  corporate
earnings  and  profits,  whereas  non-dividend  distributions  were
generally  taxed  if the  amount  realized  exceeded  shareholder  basis.
Third,  because  dividends  are  typically pro  rata, all  shareholders
would  generally  be  taxed  on  dividends;  whereas  in  non-dividend
distributions  only  shareholders  receiving  cash  or  other  property
would  be  taxed.  For  example,  the  repurchase  of  stock  by  a
corporation  from  some  of  its  shareholders  would  have  no  tax
consequences  for  non-selling  shareholders,  even  though  the
47 Ibid. at §  305(a) provides  that  certain stock dividends  are non-taxable,  but there  are
a  number of exceptions.  For  example, IRC § 305(b) may  require  current  taxation  of stock
dividends when other shareholders receive something else of value.  1RC § 305(c)  provides the
Treasury  with authority  to  extend  that treatment  to  other transactions  involving  changes  in
shareholder's  proportionate  interest  in  the corporation.  IRC § 306  taints  certain  preferred
stock dividends, so that they will be denied  capital gains  treatment on  later sale or disposition.
48 Ibid  at §  355  generally  conditions  non-taxability  on  the distribution  of control,  the
presence  of active businesses  in the distributing  and distributed  companies,  and  the absence
of a device  to distribute earnings  and  profits.
49 Ibid at § 341.
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redemption  could  be  re-characterized  as  a  dividend  to  all
shareholders followed by sales of stock among those shareholders.50
The  1986  Act  changed  the  stakes  dramatically  for  the
distinction  between  dividend  and  non-dividend  distributions  of
corporate  earnings,  by  eliminating  the  preferential  treatment  of
capital gains.  The  current regime  is  unnecessarily complicated  and
sometimes  requires  distinctions  that no longer matter.  Accordingly,
just as  the 1986  changes  and the taxpayer response  to them require
refinement of the scope of the corporate tax base, so those changes
suggest  that  further  refinement  of  the  provisions  for  taxing
shareholder distributions  is  in order.
There  are  at  least  three  possible  responses  to  the  current
situation regarding distributions.  First, one might take the view that
repeal  of the  capital  gains  preference  is  not  necessarily  stable;  so
that  the  existing  regime  should  be  left  in  place  because  it  would
have  to  be  reintroduced  if  the  capital  gains  preference  were
restored51
A  second  response  is  that  redesign  of  the  corporate  tax
should take advantage of capital gains repeal to simplify the taxation
of  distribution.  In  this  view,  the  main  pre-1986  difference  in
treatment between  dividends  and non-dividend  distributions  was the
possibility  of  capital  gains  status  for  the  latter.  The  other
differences  could be reduced  by repealing  the earnings-and-profits
concept  for  domestic  purposes  and  adopting  a  uniform  method  of
recovering  shareholder  basis  that  would  apply  to  all  forms  of
corporate distribution.5 2  The post-1986 function of the capital gains
concept  in  limiting  the  category  of  income  against  which  capital
losses  can be fully deducted could be more directly accomplished  by
50  M.A.  Chirelstein,  "Optional  Redemptions  and  Optimal  Dividends:  Taxing  the
Repurchase  of Common  Shares" (1969)  78 Yale  L.J.  739.
51 Even on this view, however, the collapsible corporation  provisions could be eliminated
if the target  of those provisions was thought  to be  avoidance  of the corporate  tax by  taking
advantage of the General Utilities doctrine.
52 The earnings  and  profits  concept  has  long  been  criticized.  See, for  example,  W.D.
Andrews, "'Out of its Earnings and Profits':  Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends"
(1956  Harv.  L.  Rev. 1403;  WJ.  Blum,  'The Earnings  and  Profits Limitation  on Dividend
Income:  A Reappraisal"  (1975)  53  Taxes 68.
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limiting the deductibility  of losses  to a  narrower  category  of gains,
such as  those on publicly-traded  assets.53  Finally, in the interest  of
simplicity,  this  approach  would  ignore  the  remaining  difference
between  dividend  and  non-dividend  distributions  - that  all
shareholders  are  usually  taxed  on  dividend  distributions,  whereas
non-dividend  distributions  result  in  the  taxation  of  only  those
shareholders who  receive  cash  or other property.
The  third,  and  final,  possible  response  to  repeal  of  the
capital  gains  preference  attacks  this  remaining  difference.  The
premise  of this  third  approach  is  that  corporations  should  not  be
able to distribute their earnings at a substantially reduced tax cost  by
replacing  dividends  with  non-dividend  distributions,  even  after  the
elimination  of the capital  gains  preference.  The  resulting  tax  cost
would be especially  reduced  if the  only shareholders  electing  to  be
taxed  by,  for  example,  selling  stock  back  to  the  corporation  are
those who  are  effectively  non-taxable,  either  by  status  or  because
shareholder  basis has been stepped-up  by a  testamentary  transfer.5 4
If the  opportunity  to  avoid  taxation  by  not  taking  cash  or
property in a non-dividend  distribution is considered  significant, how
could  the corporate  tax be  redesigned  to  eliminate  or reduce  that
possibility?  There  are  at  least  two  choices.  First,  the  existing
modest  statutory  provisions  that  impute  dividend  treatment  to
shareholders  who  experience  an  increase  in  their  proportionate
interest  in the corporation  could  be expanded.55  Alternatively,  the
American  Law  Institute  study  mentioned  earlier  proposed  that  a
special excise  tax  be collected  from  any  corporation  making a  non-
dividend  distribution.56   This  excise  is  intended  to compensate  for
the lower  tax cost of such distributions  to shareholders.  The scope
of this  approach is perhaps  broader than  is at first obvious, because
See,  for  example,  M.D.  Ginsburg,  "Reexamining  Subchapter  C:  An  Overview  and
Some Modest  Proposals to Stimulate Debate" in Subchapter C Conference Proceedings,  supra,
note 22.
54  JRC, supra, note  6  at  § 1014  provides  that the  basis  of an  asset  received  from  a
decedent  is  its value  as of the decedent's death.
55 Ibid  at § 305(c).
5 6 ALI Reporter's Study, supra, note  14 at 401-86.
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the purchase  by corporation  A of unrelated  corporation  B's  stock
from individual  shareholders is,  in effect, a non-dividend  distribution
by  corporation  A  to  individual  shareholders.  Accordingly,  full
implementation  of this  approach  would  require  application  of the
excise  tax  to  corporate  purchases  of  stock  from  unrelated
individuals.
57
To  recapitulate,  repeal  of  the  capital  gains  preference
dramatically  changes  the  stakes  in  the  taxation  of  corporate
distributions  to shareholders.  If that repeal  is  thought likely to  be
permanent,  the  distinction  between  dividends  and  non-dividend
distributions  could  be greatly  simplified  by reducing  the  remaining
differences  in  tax  cost  for  the  various  methods  of  distributing
corporate earnings  to shareholders.  Complete  elimination  of those
differences  would,  however,  require  adoption  of the  excise  tax  or
something like it.
3.  Mergers,  acquisitions,  and liquidations
Another area that is ripe for legislative  change  is the set of
provisions  concerning  corporate  mergers,  acquisitions,  and
liquidations.  The Internal Revenue  Code has  long  drawn  a  basic
distinction  between  sales,  which  are  taxable  events,  and  corporate
reorganizations,  which  are  non-taxable  for  both  shareholders  and
corporations58  The distinction derives  from the realization concept
and is clear  at the extremes.  For example, sale of corporate  assets
or stock for  cash  has  been considered  a significant  enough  change
in position to impose income taxation on the selling party.59  On the
other  hand,  merger  of  one  company  into  another  with  the
shareholders  of  the  merged  company  receiving  only  stock  of  the
surviving  company  has  not  been  thought  to  involve  the  kind  of
change  in  position  generally  required  for  taxation  for  either  the
5 7 1bid  at 473.  For small investments  in corporate stock, a  roughly  comparable  result
could be achieved by denying the intercorporate dividend exclusion with respect to such stock.
Aid- at 487-513.
58 1RC, supra note 6, §§  354, 358,  368, 361, 362.
59  Id  at §  1001.
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merging  corporations  or  their  shareholders.60   Although  the
distinction  is  clear  in  extreme  cases,  its  implementation  in  the
United  States  has  required  a  maddingly  complicated  statute,61  a
variety  of additional  judicial  requirements  (such  as  a  continuity  of
propriety  interest,  business  purpose,  and  continuity  of  business
enterprise)  for  reorganization  status,62  and  a  massive  volume  of
judicial  decisions  and  administrative  rulings  to  enforce  the  oft-
repeated  proposition that  the substance  of the  transaction,  not  its
form,  determines  the tax consequences.
a)  Elective corporate taxation of acquisitions
In 1982, the American Law Institute proposed a fundamental
reformulation of the corporate reorganization provisions under which
the  traditional  realization-based  approach  would  be  replaced  by
elective  treatment  at  the  corporate  level.63  Shareholder  taxation
would  be  determined  separately  on  the  basis  of the  consideration
received  by  particular  shareholders.64  In  1985,  the  staff  of  the
Senate  Finance  Committee  made  similar  proposals.65  While  this
approach was  not  adopted  by the  1986 Act, it is  very much  on  the
current reform agenda.  The argument  for its  adoption involves  five
steps:  (i) that corporate  acquisitions should be recategorized  on the
basis  of  a  functional  distinction  between  carryover  and  cost-basis
acquisitions;  (ii) that the current system is already effectively elective
between  these  two  types  of  acquisitions  in  many  cases;  (iii)  that
simplicity  and the role of the corporate income  tax would be served
60  kid at § 368(a)(1)(A).
61  See Levin  & Ginsburg, supra, note 22.
62 See  B.  Wolfman,  Federal Income  Taxation of Business Enteiprise, 2d  ed.  (Boston:
Little, Brown,  1982) at 621-50.
63 ALI Acquisition Proposals,  supra, note 14 at 22-150.
64  bikd  at 151-97.
65  U.S.  Congress, 99th Sess.,  1st Sess., Staff  of the Senate Committee on  Finance,  The
Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985 (S.  Prt. 99-47,  1985)  [hereinafter Senate Staff Proposals].
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by  making  the  election  explicit;  (iv)  that  although  certain
discontinuities  addressed  by  this  approach  were  eliminated  by  the
1986 Act, others were  created;  and  (v) that the design implications
of the election  are more acceptable  than the alternatives.
(i)  Carryover- versus  cost-basis  acquisitions
The  1982 American  Law Institute  recommendations  suggest
that the controlling legal concepts be formulated not in terms of the
traditional distinction between sales and reorganizations, but in terms
of  a  more  functional  distinction  between  two  kinds  of corporate
acquisitions  said to be implicit  in current  law:  first,  carryover-basis
transactions  in which the transferor  of corporate assets  is not taxed,
and the acquiring corporation  takes a carryover basis in the acquired
assets,  and second,  cost-basis  transactions  in which  the transferor  of
corporate assets  is taxed,  and the  acquiring corporation  takes a  cost
basis in  the acquired  assets.
This  distinction  does  not  depend  on  the  consideration
transferred  by  the  acquiring  corporation,  nor  on  the  form  of the
corporate  transaction.  Thus, acquisitions  of either corporate  assets
or stock, paid for with either cash or stock of the acquiring company
could  be  either  carryover-basis  or  cost-basis  transactions  at  the
election  of the taxpayers,  as  long  as the corporate parties  reported
the acquisitions  consistently.
(ii)  Effective  electivity
The  next step  in the argument  is  that the current  system is
already  effectively  elective  between  carryover-basis  and  cost-basis
acquisitions  in many  cases.  As  a consequence  of the repeal  of the
General Utilities doctrine,  stock  purchases  for  cash  are  currently
subject  to  explicitly  elective  treatment.66   Hence,  an  acquiring
corporation  can purchase the stock of a target corporation  for cash
and,  if  nothing  more  is  done,  the  target's  basis  in  its  assets  will
remain unchanged  and the target will pay no taxes.  If, on the other
hand, the acquiring corporation so  elects, it can step up the target's
66 1RC, supra, note 6 at § 338.
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basis  in  its  assets  as  long  as the  target  corporation  recognizes  gain
as if it had  sold those  assets.67  Stock acquisitions  made with stock
of the  acquiring corporation  can  achieve  carryover-basis  treatment
under  the reorganization  provisions;68  cost-basis  treatment  of such
acquisitions can be obtained if the requirements  of a reorganization
are not satisfied.
Asset purchases  for cash will result in taxation of the selling
(target)  company  and a  cost basis  for the purchasing  corporation  if
no  further  action  is  taken.  Carryover-basis  asset  acquisitions  for
cash  require  several  transactional  steps,  such  as  the  acquiring
corporation  buying  stock  of  the  target  and  then  liquidating  the
target  to receive its  assets with the  target's previous  basis.69  Asset
acquisitions  with  stock  of  the  acquiring  corporation  can  achieve
carryover-basis treatment under the reorganization provisions; 7 0  cost-
basis  treatment  of  such  acquisitions  can  be  obtained  if  the
requirements  of a reorganization  are not satisfied.
The argument  is not that sophisticated  tax practitioners  can
necessarily  accomplish  every result desired  by corporate parties,  but
that  every  desired  result  can  be  accomplished  by  some  form  of
corporate transaction.  There may, however, be valid non-tax reasons
for not adopting a particular transactional form, so some results may
be  precluded  for  legitimate  business  reasons.  For  example,  the
67 The cost-basis election was introduced  in  1982 and replaced  the previous  requirement
that  the acquiring company  liquidate the newly acquired  subsidiary to receive  a cost  basis  in
the  target's  assets.  Internal Revenue  Code, supra, note  6  at  § 334(b)(2).  The  statutory
opportunity  to take  a cost  basis  in the  target  corporation's  assets after  a stock  acquisition,
either by liquidation  or election,  derives  from  the availability  of a cost  basis  if the assets of
the  target are purchased  either from  the target or from  the target's shareholders  after  the
shareholders have liquidated the target.  Before this opportunity was made available by statute,
the courts had to distinguish acquisitions in which the acquiring corporation sought the target's
assets from  those in  which the acquiring  corporation  sought the target's  stock.  The  former
would giver rise to a cost basis in  the target's assets, while  the latter would yield  a carryover
basis.  See, for example, Kimbell-Diamond  Milling Co. v. Commissioner (1950),  14 T.C. 74.
68 For example, IRC, supra, note  6 at § 368(a)(1)(A)&(B).
69 Ibid at § 332 provides that liquidation  of a controlled subsidiary is non-taxable  to the
parent  corporation; /RC §  337 provides  that  it is  non-taxable  to  the subsidiary;  and  IRC §
334(b) provides that the parent  takes  the subsidiary's basis  in  the transferred  assets.
70 For example, ibid at § 368(a)(1)(C).
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carryover-basis  asset  acquisition  described  in  the  last  paragraph
requires  the  acquiring  corporation  either to  exchange  its stock  for
the desired  assets or to take the target corporation's  environmental
and  other  liabilities,  as  a  result  of  the  target's  liquidation.  The
argument  for elective  treatment on  this view  of current law is  that
making  the  election  between  carryover-basis  and  cost-basis
acquisitions  explicit would  both simplify the taxation of acquisitions
and  separate  the  tax  consequences  from the  availability  of various
corporate procedures.
(iii)  Role  of the corporate tax
The view that taxpayers  should be able  to freely  elect  cost-
or  carryover-basis  treatment,  no  matter  whether  the  transaction
would be classified  as a sale  or a  reorganization  under current  law,
is  related  to  conceiving  of  the  corporate  tax  as  having  two
functions.71  First,  it  implements  the  double  tax  on  the  current
operating  income  of  corporations.  Second,  it  functions  as  a
substitute  tax on  non-operating  income  of corporations  when  that
income  is  not taxed  currently  to shareholders.  This  refinement  of
the  classical view of the corporate tax  suggests that the double  tax
need not apply to the realization  of gain on corporate assets outside
the usual  course of business  if shareholders  are currently  taxed.
Allowing  corporate  acquisitions  to achieve  either carryover-
basis  or  cost-basis  treatment  is  consistent  with  this  view  of  the
corporate tax, as long as a corporation transferring  assets in a carry-
over basis  asset acquisition  cannot retain the consideration  received
for  the  assets  in  order  to  avoid  current  shareholder  taxation.
Accordingly,  the  proposals  generally  limit  the  availability  of  an
election  for  carryover-basis  treatment  of  two  types  of  asset
acquisitions:  (1)  mergers  or  consolidations  that  do  not  involve
consideration  that would  be taxable  if  distributed  to shareholders;
and  (2) asset  acquisitions  in which the corporation  transferring  the
assets  distributes  the  consideration  received  for  the  assets  to  its
71 ALl Acquisition Proposals,  supra, note 14 at 15-19.
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shareholders  in  a  taxable  transaction.72   Thus,  in  every  cash
acquisition of assets there would be at least one tax collected:  from
the shareholders of the selling corporation  if the cash is  distributed
to them,  and from the selling corporation  if it is not so distributed.
(iv)  Discontinuities
Before  the  repeal  of  the  General Utilities  doctrine,  the
acquiring  corporation  could  obtain  a  cost  basis  without  any
correlative  taxation  of  the  transferring  corporation.73   This
discontinuity was one of the principal defects  of General Utilities for
many of its opponents.74  The 1986 repeal eliminated that possibility,
but  introduced  some additional  discontinuities.  Consider,  first,  the
sale  of stock  by  individual  shareholders  to  an  acquiring  company
versus  the sale  of corporate  assets  to  that company.  As  described
above,  the  Code  currently  allows  explicitly  elective  treatment  on
stock, but not asset,  acquisitions.7s
Now  consider  the  sale  by a  corporate  parent  of stock  in  a
wholly-owned subsidiary.  If the corporate parent sells the subsidiary
stock  to  an  acquiring  corporation  for  cash  and  distributes  the
proceeds to the corporate parent's individual shareholders,  there will
be  a  corporate  tax  due on the  sale, but  the  acquiring  corporation
will not receive  a correlative  step-up  in corporate asset  basis unless
gain is  recognized  on  the subsidiary's  assets.76  That  is,  carryover-
basis  treatment  is not available  even though individual shareholders
of  the  selling  corporation  pay  a  current  tax.  Under  these
72 ALIAcquition Proposals,  ibid at 73-74; Senate Staff Proposals,  supra, note  65 at 50.
73 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 338 of the Internal  Revenue Code provided  that
the target was taxed as though it had sold its assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation, but such
sales were  generally  not  taxable.  See  Internal Revenue  Code, supra, note  6  at  § 337  (as
amended prior to  1986).
74 Senate Staff Proposals,  supra, note  65 at 42-44, 59-61.
75 1RC, supra, note 6 at § 338.
76 Ibid  §  338(h)(10)  provides  a  special  election  to  have  the gain  recognized  on  the
subsidiary's assets, rather than on the sale of the subsidiary stock.
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circumstances, the parties may be subject to "triple" taxation, because
another  corporate  tax will be levied  if the  acquired  subsidiary  sells
its  assets.  This  problem  derives  from  the  possibility  that  a
corporation's  basis  in  the stock  of a  subsidiary  can differ  from the
subsidiary's  basis  in its assets.
There  are  some  tax-planning  responses  to  these
discontinuities,  but their  validity is  uncertain.77  In addition,  these
discontinuities  may  put  further  pressure  on the  provisions  of the
Internal Revenue  Code  that  are  designed  to  distinguish  taxable
dividends  from  non-taxable  corporate  divisions.7 8  For  example,
corporate  assets  could  be  transferred  to  a  subsidiary,  the  stock of
which  is transferred  to individual  shareholders,  who would later  sell
the  subsidiary  stock  for  cash  to  an  acquiring  corporation,  which
liquidates  the acquired  subsidiary.  If the  form  of that transaction
were  respected,  the  purchasing  corporation  would  have  achieved  a
carryover-basis  asset  acquisition  with  only  one  tax,  paid  by  selling
shareholders.  Such  a  series  of steps  would,  however,  have  to  run
the gamut of provisions  designed to re-characterize  transactions  that
are essentially  substitutes for dividends. 79
(v)  Implications  for corporate  tax design
There  are  three  possible  statutory  responses  to  the
discontinuities  between  asset  and  stock  acquisitions  under  current
law:  (1)  adoption  of  the  American  Law  Institute  and  Senate
Finance  Committee  staff proposals  to  extend  elective treatment  to
asset  acquisitions,  (2) elimination of the election  currently available
in stock acquisitions,  and  (3)  tolerance  of the inconsistency between
asset and stock acquisitions.  Each of these alternatives  requires  the
articulation of distinctions  that may not easily be implemented.
The  first  response,  adoption  of elective  treatment  for  asset
acquisitions,  is  consistent  with  the  refined  classical  view  of  the
77  See, for example, J.A.  Baker  III, "Letter" (1986)  33 Tax Notes 1073.
78 IRC, supra, note  6 at § 355.
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corporate  income  tax described  above  in  (iii), but  would  involve  a
number of new concepts.  To begin with, acquisitions  eligible for the
election would have  to be defined.  In general,  the American  Law
Institute  and  Senate  Finance  Committee  staff  proposals  are
applicable to  stock acquisitions  in which  80  percent of the  target's
stock is obtained, and to asset acquisitions  involving either statutory
mergers  or the transfer of substantially all  the assets  of the target
corporation, followed  by a liquidation of the target.80
The most difficult design  issue  in implementing  this  general
approach would be specification of when the election is available  on
acquisitions  of less than all the  assets  of a  corporation  or  affiliated
group  of corporations.81  At  one  extreme,  transfer  of  any  asset,
other than  sale  of an  item  of inventory  in  the  ordinary course  of
business,  could  be subject to the  election if the  selling corporation
distributed the sale proceeds to shareholders, on the ground that the
asset  could  have  been  separately  incorporated  and  that  the
articulated  role  of  the  corporate  tax  would  be  served  because
shareholders would  be taxed currently.  Alternatively,  a  transfer of
substantially all the assets of a corporation or an affiliated  group, or
perhaps the transfer of a  pre-existing  subsidiary, might be required.
Another, intermediate,  solution would be to  require the  transfer of
an active business, as is now necessary for non-recognition treatment
of  corporate  divisions.82   Once  the  scope  of  the  election  was
determined,  a  correlative  decision  would  be  required  on  whether
consistency  rules for  corporate  transferors  or transferees  would  be
necessary  to protect  the election from  expansion by  tax planning.83
Sometimes  it  is  suggested  that  there  should  be  special
elections  available  for  land,  goodwill,  and  other  non-amortizable
intangibles,  because  a  cost  basis  would  not  provide  the  acquiring
corporation with additional depreciation  deductions even though the
8 0 ALIAcquisition Proposals,  supra, note 14 at 43, 73-74,  145-46; Senate Staff Proposals,
supra, note  65 at 50.
81 ALI Acquisition Proposals,  ibid at 92-101.
82 IRC, supra, note 6 at § 355.
83 Cf  ibid  at § 338(t)  (consistency  provisions  applicable  to stock  acquisitions  under
current law).
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corporate seller is  taxed8 4  Thus, a  carryover-basis  treatment might
be  permitted  for  transfers  of  goodwill  in  a  transaction  otherwise
considered  a cost-basis  acquisition.
Finally,  proposals  for  elective  treatment  would  generally
conform  a  corporation's  basis  in  the stock of its  subsidiary  to  the
subsidiary's  basis  in  its  assets,85  but  a  special  problem  arises  on  a
carryover-basis  stock acquisition,  followed by resale of the acquired
subsidiary's  stock  within  a  relatively  short  time.  Arguably,  the
corporate  parent  should be able  to compute  gain or  loss  using the
cost of the stock for at least some limited period.  Otherwise, there
might be another corporate  tax due where  there was  no  additional
economic  gain.
The  second  response  to  the  inconsistency  in  current  law
between  asset  and stock acquisitions  is  to  achieve  consistency  with
the result  in  asset transfers  by  requiring  taxation  at  the  corporate
level  when  there  is  a  significant  transfer  of stock to  an  acquiring
corporation.86  The  rationale  for  this  result  is  that  a  significant
transfer  of  corporate  assets  should  be  a  taxable  event  at  the
corporate  level,  whether  accomplished  by  acquisition  of the  target
company's  assets  or  its  stock.  The  main  implementation  issue
implicated  by this  approach  is  to define when there is  a  significant
enough shift  in share ownership  to trigger corporate  taxation.8 7
The  third,  and  final,  possible  response  is  to  tolerate
inconsistent  treatment  of stock and  asset acquisitions  by continuing
the  election  for  cost-basis  or  carryover-basis  stock  acquisitions
without  extending  the election  to asset  acquisitions.  The  rationale
for this  result would be that acquisition of the assets of a corporate
business  should be  considered  a  corporate  realization  event  under
the  classical  system  even  if  acquisition  of  a  corporation's  stock  is
84 ALIAcquisitions Proposals,  supra, note 14 at 120-33; Senate Staff Proposals,  supra note
65 at 54-55.
85 ALl Acquisition Proposals,  ibid.; Senate Staff Proposals, ibid.  at 54-55.
86 In terms of the structure of current law, this would require a mandatory election  under
IRC, supra, note 6 at § 338.
87  Cf.,  ibid  at §  382(g)  (defining  shifts  of stock  ownership  for purposes  limiting  loss
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not.  The  major  design  issue  under  this  approach  would  be  to
distinguish between  stock and asset  acquisitions.88
b)  Other merger, acquisition, and liquidation issues
Although  the  proposal  for  elective  treatment  of  asset
acquisition  has been  the most  widely  discussed  potential  change  in
this  area,  there  are  other  important  issues  to  be  resolved  with
respect to  mergers  and acquisitions.  Four will be briefly  identified
here.
(i)  Shareholder taxation
Should the criteria for taxation of a particular shareholder  be
developed separately from those governing corporate treatment  and
the treatment  of other  shareholders,  as suggested by  the American
Law  Institute  and  the  Senate  Finance  Committee  staff?  Non-
taxability  of  shareholders  under  these  proposals  would  depend
strictly on  the consideration  received  by that shareholder.89
(ii)  Refinement  of the current  regime
If  the  elective  approach  for  corporate  taxation  is  rejected
and  the basic  distinction  in  current  law  between  taxable  sales  and
non-taxable  reorganizations  is  maintained,  could  the  governing
provisions  be substantially simplified  by reducing  the discontinuities
among  different  types of reorganizations? 90
88 Cf. Commissioner  v. Court Holding Co., 324  U.S.  331  (1945)  (sale of assets);  United
States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,  338 U.S.  451  (1950)  (sale of stock).
89 ALIAcquisition Proposals,  supra, note 14 at 151-97;  Senate Staff  Proposals,  supra, note
65 at 52-53.
90 See,  for  example,  American  Bar  Association  Section  of  Taxation,  Committee  on
Corporate Stockholder Relationships, "Recommendation No. 1981-5" (1981)  34 Tax Law 1386.
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(iii)  Incorporation  provisions
In recent  years,  taxpayers  have  attempted  to  achieve  non-
recognition  treatment  in  some  acquisitions  that  would  be  taxable
under  reorganization  concepts  by  arguing that  the non-recognition
provisions dealing with incorporation transactions can also be applied
to  mergers  and  acquisitions.91  A  design  decision  will  thus  be
required  on how the reorganization  and incorporation  provisions  of
the Internal  Revenue Code should be interrelated.
(iv)  Net operating  loss carryforwards
Finally,  as described  above,92 the  1986  legislation includes  a
new  set  of limitations  on  loss  carryforwards,  designed  to  limit  the
value  of  such  carryforwards  after  a  merger  or  acquisition  to  the
value  that  the  losses  would  have  had  to  the company  transferring
the losses.  The extent to which those proposals will accomplish that
goal  in  practice,  and  whether  the  goal  is  desirable,  remain  open
questions.
4.  International  issues
The  1986  rate  reduction  is  also  likely  to  lead  to
reconsideration  of  certain  aspects  of  the  U.S.  regime  for  taxing
international  income  flows.  International  issues  have  not  yet
received  the  same  attention  as  those  involving  the  scope  of the
corporate tax base, distributions,  and acquisitions, 93  so we will simply
identify  the major questions  that have to be addressed.
91  See,  for example,  Rev. Rul. 84-71,  1984  C.b.  106 (reconsidering  previous  ruling that
incorporation  provisions were  inapplicable  in  certain acquisitive  transactions).
92 See text at 316-17.
93  United  States  Treasury  Department,  Outline of Issues for the  Treawy Study  of
Subchapter C (9  April 1987)  indicates  that the Treasury will give substantial consideration  to
international  issues.
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a)  U.S. investment abroad
Domestic  rate  reduction  and  repeal  of  the  capital  gains
preference raise three major issues.  First, should the United States
reconsider  its  traditional  systems  of  taxing  worldwide  corporate
income with a  credit for foreign  taxes paid,  because  U.S.  rates  are
now  lower  than  those  imposed  by  many  of its  trading  partners?
Alternatives  include  an  exemption  for  foreign  income  and  a
deduction  for foreign  taxes.
Second,  should  the  distinction  in  the  treatment  of  a  U.S.
company's  foreign  branches  (income  taxed  currently)  and  foreign
subsidiaries  (income  not  taxed  until  repatriated)  be  reconsidered?
If the current system of deferral remains in place, there will certainly
be  scrutiny  of  the  provisions  designed  to  limit  opportunities  for
deferral.94
Third, reconsideration of the earnings-and-profits  concept will
necessarily  include  the  special  function  of  that  concept  in  the
international  context, where it is used to measure the U.S.  tax base
of foreign subsidiaries  and to identify the foreign  income related  to
foreign  taxes paid. 5
b)  Foreign investment in the United States
Many  countries,  including  the  United  States,  impose  a
withholding  tax  on certain  categories  of income,  such  as  corporate
dividends,  flowing  out  of  the  country  to  foreign  investors.96
Reduction  of domestic  tax rates  raises the question  of whether  the
withholding rates, which  were intended to  approximate  net taxation
on certain  items  of gross  income,  should  now also  be reduced.  In
addition,  the  growth  of  do-it-yourself  integration  may  lead  to
For  example, IRC, supra, note  6  at §  482 (reallocation  of income  and  deductions
among related  parties); IRC § 367 (relating  to certain  transfers  in and  out of the U.S.); IRC
§§  951-964  (requiring  the  current  taxation  of  the  income  of  certain  controlled  foreign
corporations).
95 For example, ibid at  §§  902, 952.
9 6 1bid  at §§  871(a), 881,  1441,  1442.
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reconsideration  of  the  current  exemption  from  withholding  for
certain  categories of corporate interest  payments.97
Repeal  of  the  capital  gains  preference  for  U.S.  taxpayers
raises  the  question  of  whether  the  virtual  exemption  of  foreign
investors  from  U.S.  taxation  of  capital  gains  on  stock  in  U.S.
corporations  (other  than  those  sufficiently  related  to  U.S.  real
estate)  can be maintained. 8
Finally, current issues include whether the new branch-profits
tax will  accomplish  its  intended  goal  of implementing  the  classical
double tax for  foreign  corporations  operating  in the  United States,
and whether that goal  is desirable.
C.  Summary of the Current  Situation
The  current  corporate tax  regime  in the United  States  can
be characterized  as unstable in the areas we have considered.  First,
the  1986 Act creates  new pressures  on the scope  of the  double tax,
with  taxpayers  likely  to  move  aggressively  to  adopt  do-it-yourself
integration  in order to take  advantage  of relatively lower  individual
tax rates.  Second,  for those corporate assets  that remain subject  to
the  classical  double  tax,  the  current  system  is  not  designed  for  a
world with no capital gains preference and a corporate  tax rate that
is  higher than  the  individual  rate.  Third,  the provisions  governing
corporate reorganizations, which were not generally addressed by the
1986 legislation,  contain  many  unresolved  design  issues, with  some
new questions  raised by  the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
Fourth, the 1986 changes raise a number of questions about how the
United States  taxes international  corporate  income.
IV  FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As a result of the  1986 Act and prior proposals,  the current
situation is ripe for significant  changes  in the U.S. corporate income
For  example,  ibia  at  § 871(h)  (exemption  for  interest  received  on  portfolio  debt
investments).
98 Ibid. at §§  864(b),  871(a)(2),  897.
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tax, in spite of the passage of major tax bills in 1981,  1982, 1984 and
1986.  The  1986  legislation  mandated  a  comprehensive  study  of
corporate  taxation  by  the  Treasury  Department,  which  is  due  to
appear  by  the  end  of  the  19879  The  American  Law  Institute
Federal Income Tax Project is reappraising  its  1982 proposals in the
light  of the  recent  changes,  and  various  professional  groups  have
begun their  own studies.
Although  the  six  models described  at the beginning  of this
paper  all  describe  theoretically  possible  directions  for  future
legislation,  four  of  those  models  - accrual  taxation,  current
shareholder  taxation  of corporate  income,  cash  flow  taxation,  and
the American Law Institute  study proposals on  distributions - have
not as yet generated  much widespread interest in the United States.
If recent  Congressional  action  is  any  guide,  the most  likely
future direction is probably further refinement of the classical double
tax  system  to  prevent  the disintegration  of the  corporate  tax  base
predicted  by  some  tax practitioners.  With  regard  to  the scope  of
the  corporate  tax,  that  would  probably  mean  clarification  of the
taxation  of publicly-traded  partnerships, reconsideration  of the role
of subchapter  S, and,  perhaps,  an  attempt  to  classify  as  equity  any
debt  issued  in  exchange  for  outstanding  equity.  With  regard  to
distributions  on equity, this  approach  would  mean elimination  of at
least some of the remaining  differences  in the  taxation  of dividend
and  non-dividend  distributions,  if full  taxation  of  capital  gains  is
thought  to be stable.  This  approach  might  also suggest  reluctance
to  adopt  full  electivity  for  corporate  acquisitions,  on  the  grounds
that  corporations,  like  individuals,  should  pay  taxes  in  accordance
with  a  realization  concept,  rather  than  an  election.  Finally,  the
implications  of recent  Congressional  action for  future legislation  in
the  international  area  are  less  clear,  although  refinement  of  the
classical system could lead  to a more rigorous implementation  of the
double  tax  with  regard  to  international  income,  perhaps  reducing
opportunities  for deferral.
My own preference would be for a different approach, which
would begin  movement toward integration of the individual  and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra, note 29 at  § 634.  The  Treasury  has  released  an
outline of issues to be studied.  See supra, note 93.
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corporate  income  taxes.  Pressures  against  that  result  in  the
immediate  future include revenue  consideration  and  the feeling  on
the  part  of many  observers  that  Congress  rejected  the integration
alternative  in  1986.  On  the  other  hand,  uncertainty  about  the
economic  effects  of the double tax system,  the spread of integrated
regimes  in  other  developed  countries,  and  whatever  opportunities
remain  for  do-it-yourself  integration  after  the  next  round  of
legislation,  may  ultimately move  the United States  in  the  direction
of integration.  In that case, the work done by the Canadian Carter
Commission  more than  twenty  years  ago  will  remain  an  important
standard  against which  future U.S.  corporate  tax legislation  will be
measured.